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[Editor’s note:  Professor Roumasset served as Rapporteur for the session on Privatizing Water and Wastewater 
Systems at the 1999 UCOWR Annual Conference at Kamuela, Hawaii.  His summary of the presentations and 
discussions at that session provides a very clear and helpful overview of the key issues, and is reprinted here for that 
purpose.  Note that three of the conference papers cited by Professor Roumasset (Beecher, Moore, and Manning and 
Mason)  formed the bases for papers in this volume.] 
 
 
PROBLEMS WITH PUBLIC OWNERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
 
Publicly owned and publicly managed water utilities are 
thought to incur excessive costs of construction, 
procurement, and operation; over-utilize debt and 
overcapitalize; under-innovate; under-charge; and favor 
politically influential groups (Beecher, 1995 and 1999).  
Ironically, while environmental concerns are often cited 
as a justification for public intervention, the high costs 
that environmental regulations impose are often the 
straw that breaks the back of public water management 
(Moore, 1999).  Moreover, the empirical trend towards 
deregulation and privatization cannot be ignored. 
 
PRIVATIZATION OPTIONS: CONTRACTING 
VS. PRIVATE OWNERSHIP 
 
There was an apparent consensus among the authors 
that “privatization” is a rather vague characterization of 
several institutional alternatives to public management.  
Private ownership with public regulation of rates and 
charges, the historical standard for other public utilities, 
was not seriously considered by any of the authors.  
Even industries such as electric power and 
telecommunications, where the regulated natural 
monopoly approach once was the norm, are being 
deregulated.  The two forms of privatization that are 
most relevant to water and wastewater systems are 
public ownership, with private management effected via 
competitive contracts, and private ownership. 
 
Contracting for Private Management 
  
In the contracts model, the city or state government 
retains ownership of the water facilities and tenders 
contracts to private companies for the management 
thereof.  As explained by Beecher, the contracting 
process must contain a number of safeguards in order to 
be protective of the interests of the principal (typically a 
unit of local government), including a well-designed 
process of competitive bidding, incentive-based 
compensation along with measurable performance 
targets, and a procedure for complying with state and 
federal regulations. 
 
The contracting model has a number of potential 
problems of its own, however.  The one receiving the 
most attention in the sessions was the length of the 
contractual relationship.  Moore posits that the reason 
for the empirical trend towards longer-term contracts is 
efficiency.  For example, long-term contracts allow 
management to accommodate full employment 
obligations (for the existing employees) without 
substantial loss in profits.  They likewise motivate 
private investment and appear to lead to greater cost 
savings.  Beecher points out, however, that long-term 
contracts diminish competition, leading to de facto 
monopoly, and the cost-savings of privatization redound 
to the private company not the rate-paying public. 
 
Because the nature of water resources and the needs of 
water consumers vary across communities and because 
there is not an extensive history of private water 
contracting, there is not a well-developed menu of best 
practices from which communities can draw when 
designing contractual mechanisms suitable for their 
individual situations.  Those designing said contracts 
face an inevitable tradeoff.  If they try to specify every 
possible performance measure and every contingency, 
the contract will be too complex, too expensive to 
design and too difficult to monitor.   If they try to 
simplify the contract, the concessionaire or franchisee 
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will be motivated to stint on the unspecified and 
unmeasured (or poorly measured) objectives. 
 
A long-term partnership between local government and 
a private company, as envisioned by Moore, may indeed 
succeed if the local government partners with a “win-
win” oriented company which believes that its long-
term interests are aligned with improved and more 
economical customer service.  The risk remains, 
however, that the company will behave 
opportunistically instead, seeking opportunities to 
exploit its insider position to “hold-up” the customers 
for higher rates.   
 
A research challenge is to find a mechanism for 
exploiting the benefits of long-term partnership, while 
simultaneously exploiting the discipline of competition.  
One possibility is to empower an “accountability” 
agency to compare the performance of private 
companies across communities.  Such comparisons 
would not be trivial exercises.  They should include not 
only multiple performance characteristics but the nature 
of the water resources at hand, as well as an estimate of 
the “first-best” efficient solution for each situation. 
 
Another challenge is to provide an appropriate 
conceptual framework for extracting normative lessons 
from the contracting experiences of various 
communities.  Key to this endeavor would be discerning 
between situations wherein the local government:  
 
• Successfully designs company-selection and 
incentive mechanisms that improve the quality of 
service (including environmental standards) and 
lower financial costs facing tax and rate-payers, 
• Attempts to achieve the above outcomes only to find 
that the private contractor has exploited its insider-
advantage for higher profits and failed to achieve the 
objectives, and 
• Actively or passively colludes with the private 
company in the pursuit of mutual gains that do not 
benefit the ostensible beneficiaries of privatization. 
 
Instances of this category include the exploitation of 
perverse tax laws (see below) and the use of the 
contracting mechanism to exploit implicit loopholes in 
the public-utility regulatory commissions of many states 
(Beecher). 
  
Private Ownership 
 
One solution to the agency problems discussed above is 
to unify the principal (owner) and agent (contractor) 
through private ownership.  This solution creates the 
need for increased regulation, however, because the 
owner is a monopolist and does not automatically seek 
to serve the public interest.  Regulation, in turn, brings 
some of the same problems of public ownership and 
management, including overcapitalization and the 
politicization of the public utility. 
 
This dilemma poses another research challenge, namely 
whether and how water and wastewater services can be 
effectively deregulated.  Direct imitation of deregulation 
in the electric power and/or telecommunications sectors 
is clearly not feasible.  Whether a deregulation option 
will emerge that is appropriate to the water sector 
remains to be seen. 
 
PUBLIC OWNERSHIP, PRIVATE EFFICIENCY 
 
Some of these reforms may be accomplished while 
retaining public ownership and management.  Edward 
Bailey described how Colorado Springs reorganized its 
water and wastewater treatment services in order to 
achieve many of the same objectives of privatization.  In 
this model, Colorado Springs Utilities (CSU) is citizen-
owned and operated.  CSU’s human resources are 
provided by the government Water Resources 
Department.  While the new organization is public in 
nature, it has apparently adapted an incentive  system 
not dissimilar from those used by long-term private 
concessionaires and achieved substantial cost savings 
and other efficiency gains.  Moreover, its charter 
provides an independence that is unlike ordinary line 
agencies of government. 
 
Manning and Mason described the approach that their 
management consulting teams use to effect efficiency 
gains in both publicly owned and privately owned but 
publicly regulated public utilities.  They see both as 
monopolies whose isolation from competition has led to 
similar bureaucratization and stagnation of operations. 
 
Both of these papers emphasize how a culture shift is 
needed before old habits and procedures can be 
discarded; they also provide details on the nature of 
thought patterns that need to be changed.  Some of the 
discussion of these papers implicitly questioned the 
transferability of this experience.  Charismatic leaders 
can perhaps transform public agencies.  One would 
think, however, that transforming the governance 
structure such that the new culture and thinking are 
effectively incentivized would have a greater chance of 
success.     
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Privatization is not a panacea that can instantly cure the 
myriad inefficiencies of public ownership and 
management.  First of all, privatization could take many 
forms.  Secondly, the two most popular forms of 
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privatizing water systems – contracting and private 
ownership – have a number of potential disadvantages. 
 
Nonetheless, the inefficiencies of the traditional 
publicly-owned-and-managed approach to water system 
organization are large and compelling enough that the 
current restructuring trend is expected to continue.  
There is neither adequate theory nor evidence to resolve 
the question of whether restructuring should or will take 
the form of private ownership, whether incentive 
compatible contract mechanisms can be devised to 
render public ownership/private management a superior 
organizational form, or whether a leaner and more 
efficient incentive structure can adequately improve on 
public management to make it the dominant approach.  
It appears that different communities will continue to 
opt for different approaches to increased efficiency 
according to their different economic and political 
circumstances. 
 
To some extent the long-term-contract organizational 
form, with ownership staying with a unit of local 
government, is emerging as the preeminent type of 
privatization in the water industry.  This contrasts 
starkly with the movement in other public utilities 
towards private ownership with competition provided 
by deregulation.  There are two apparent reasons why 
this movement has not taken off in the water industry.  
First, perverse tax laws penalize private ownership.  
Second, the technological nature of the water industry 
may be resistant to competition through deregulation. 
 
Among the policy conclusions and recommendations to 
emerge from this apparent contrast is to reform the tax 
laws that may be inhibiting the evolution of private 
ownership.  In addition, increased understanding is 
needed of whether technological idiosyncrasies of the 
water industry account for the apparent failure of the 
deregulation movement so prominent in electric power 
and telecommunications.  To the extent that competition 
among water service providers in a single market is not 
technologically desirable, alternative mechanisms of 
providing competition are needed.  One such 
institutional innovation would be to develop a 
federation among communities whereby the 
performance of various water-service providers could be 
compared.  This would induce competition among 
providers to enhance their performance ratings both to 
retain their existing contracts and to obtain contracts in 
new markets. 
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